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Abstract
Background: The dearth of health workers in rural settings in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and other 
developing countries limits healthcare access and outcomes. In evaluating non-wage financial incentive packages as a 
potential policy option to attract health workers to rural settings, understanding the expected costs and effects of the 
various programs ex ante can assist policy-makers in selecting the optimal incentive package.
Methods: We use discrete choice experiments (DCEs), costing analyses and recent empirical results linking health 
worker density and health outcomes to estimate the future location decisions of physicians and determine the cost-
effectiveness of 15 voluntary incentives packages for new physicians in Lao PDR. Our data sources include a DCE 
survey completed by medical students (n = 329) in May 2011 and secondary cost, economic and health data. Mixed 
logit regressions provide the basis for estimating how each incentive package influences rural versus urban location 
choice over time. We estimate the expected rural density of physicians and the cost-effectiveness of 15 separate 
incentive packages from a societal perspective. In order to generate the cost-effectiveness ratios we relied on the rural 
uptake probabilities inferred from the DCEs, the costing data and prior World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 
that relate health outcomes to health worker density. 
Results: Relative to no program, the optimal voluntary incentive package would increase rural physician density 
by 15% by 2016 and 65% by 2041. After incorporating anticipated health effects, seven (three) of the 15 incentive 
packages have anticipated average cost-effectiveness ratio less than the WHO threshold (three times gross domestic 
product [GDP] per capita) over a 5-year (30 year) period. The optimal package’s incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
is $1454/QALY (quality-adjusted life year) over 5 years and $2380/QALY over 30 years. Capital intensive components, 
such as housing or facility improvement, are not efficient.
Conclusion: Conditional on using voluntary incentives, Lao PDR should emphasize non-capital intensive options 
such as advanced career promotion, transport subsidies and housing allowances to improve physician distribution 
and rural health outcomes in a cost-effective manner. Other countries considering voluntary incentive programs can 
implement health worker/trainee DCEs and costing surveys to determine which incentive bundles improve rural 
uptake most efficiently but should be aware of methodological caveats. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Policy-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) can combine discrete choice and cost surveys to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
health workforce rural incentive programs.
• In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) context, the capital intensive incentives tended to be more expensive relative to the potential 
benefit they conferred to improve health.
• Investing in better data collection on the link between health outcomes and health worker density and understanding how incentives affect 
existing health workers will improve the precision of future results. 
• Policy-makers should also compare the expected costs and benefits of mandatory rural service programs for recent graduates with voluntary 
incentive approaches. 
Implications for the public
This research identifies the optimal set of incentives to encourage recent physician graduates to voluntarily practice in rural settings upon graduation 
in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR). These programs will increase the density of health workers in rural settings and improve access to care 
and health outcomes for rural inhabitants. By selecting the optimal program we also limit the cost to the Ministry of Health (MoH) (and therefore 
the public).
Key Messages 
Politics and Power in Global Health: The Constituting Role 
of Conflicts
Comment on “Navigating Between Stealth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogmatism: The 
Challenge of Researching the Nor , Politics a d Power of Global He lth”
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based n suc  an articulation.
Keywords: Global Health, Liberal Politics, Cha tal Mouffe, Conflict, AIDS, Antiret oviral (ARV) 
Treatment
Copyright: © 2016 by K rman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Askheim C, Heggen K, Engebretsen E. Politics and power in global health: the constituting role of 
conflicts:  Comment on “Navigating between stealth advocacy and unconscious dogmatism: the challenge 
of researching the norms, politics and power of global health.” Int J Health Policy Manag. 2016;5(2):117–
119. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.188
*Correspondence to:
Eivind Engebretsen
Email: eivind.engebretsen@medisin.uio.no
Article History:
Received: 5 September 2015
Accepted: 13 October 2015
ePublished: 15 October 2015
Commentary
Institute of Health and Society, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2016, 5(2), 117–119 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.188
In a recent contribution to the ngoing d ba e about throle of power in glo al health, Gorik O ms empha izes the normative underpinnings f global health politic . 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
pre ises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
glob l health and agree that “a purely empirical vidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by con rasting this ficti n 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
c nflicts and reduces it to either a rati n listic, economic 
calc lation, an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the prim ry level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
whil  by ‘politics’ I m an the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
co xistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
w rld in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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Background
Health Worker Production, Distribution and Population Health
Policy-makers, ministries of health (MoHs), donors, 
multilateral institutions and healthcare non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have increasingly recognized 
the importance of health workers as a critical input for 
improvement of population health outcomes over the 
last decade.1-5 In developing countries the limitations in 
production, productivity and output of health workers, or 
human resources for health (HRH), occurs as a result of 
several factors. First, the overall number of health workers, 
particularly in parts of Africa and Asia, is insufficient, or 
even critically low, according to public health, needs-based 
estimates and economic demand-based calculations.6-8 
Second, the appropriate shares of health worker cadres 
expected to optimize health outcomes within the budget 
constraints of developing countries is poorly understood 
– particularly as technology developments are shifting the 
relative capabilities of different types of health workers. 
Finally, the health workforce, particularly for physicians, is 
geographically skewed. Many health workers from developing 
countries emigrate to other nations,9 but, just as in the 
developed world, remaining health workers are located in 
urban areas at rates greater than the urban population share.10 
Within developing countries, the density of health workers 
relative to the population is typically significantly lower in 
rural areas than in urban areas. 
In order to attract new or existing health workers into rural 
areas, policy-makers have considered (and in some cases 
adopted) both wage-based incentives (eg, higher salaries) 
and non-wage benefits (housing, accelerated promotion in 
the public staffing system, education stipends for children, 
access to better facilities and other non-salary inducements) 
or combinations of both.11-15 For countries examining 
implementation of rural incentive strategies, mapping out 
the expected affect that the incentive packages may have 
on location choice is central. For example, recent discrete 
choice experiments (DCE) supported by CapacityPlus, the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded 
global HRH project, among health workers and students 
training to become health workers indicate that both wage 
and non-wage determinants significantly impact location 
decision.16-18
DCEs, which can yield measures of utility, uptake probability 
or value; are increasingly used in health services research and 
health economics applications including studies aiming to 
estimate: (a) willingness to pay, (b) utility weights for quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) measurement, and (c) probabilities 
and relative risk.19-21 These are applied across a variety of 
policy settings including (a) health professional choices (b) 
patient or clinician clinical choices, and (c) priority setting 
frameworks and are increasingly popular in developing 
country settings.18,22-26 Within health services research, DCEs 
have frequently been implemented to understand health 
workforce issues including applications aimed at improving 
the distribution of health workers in developing country 
settings.25,27-34 More recently novel studies have combined the 
uptake probabilities from health worker DCEs and secondary 
costing data in dynamic simulations to evaluate both the 
health worker location outcomes and associated costs of 
different policy options.33,34 
This study uniquely contributes to the DCE literature by 
combining the results of a DCE study with a costing analysis 
and health outcome projections. First, we use the mixed 
logit estimates from the DCE to determine the implied 
value (or willingness to pay) for each component of rural 
incentive packages intended to increase the attractiveness of 
practicing in rural locations. Second, we compare the implied 
valuations from the DCE with the actual expected cost to 
the payer (in this case the Lao PDR Government) for each 
of the components as reported in a separate costing exercise. 
Lastly, we use uptake probabilities derived from the DCE 
to project the degree to which various proposed incentive 
packages would likely motivate additional rural entry by new 
physicians over a 5 (and 30) year period and combine these 
estimates with emerging literature which calculates the effects 
of health worker density on health outcomes to generate 
both average and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of 15 
different voluntary rural incentive packages proposed for Lao 
PDR. 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic Human Resources for 
Health Context
Lao PDR, the setting for our study, is a lower-middle income 
(2011 gross domestic product [GDP] per capital, $1281) 
landlocked county with a population of 6.4 million (2011), 
primarily rural, citizens.35 As is the case with many lower-
middle income countries, health expenditure is a relatively 
low share of GDP (4.1% in 2011), out-of-pocket expenditure 
are high (63% of all health expenditure, 2011) and density 
of health workers is low (2.4 physicians and 7.5 nurses per 
10 000 population, 2011).36 The Lao Government, MoH, 
and multilateral partners have prioritized improvement in 
access to primary care with particular emphasis on maternal 
and child health. To this end, several recent initiatives have 
focused on increasing the number and distribution of health 
workers, particularly in rural settings where access to care is 
more challenging.36 In 2010, the Lao MoH adopted the Health 
Personnel Development Strategy (HPDS) for 2020 which 
set the framework and strategy which aimed to ensure that 
sufficient quality and quantity of health worker personnel 
are placed in appropriate in leadership, managerial and 
technical levels in the right geographic distribution with 
enough support and motivation to optimally perform their 
work.16 One of the central tenets of the HPDS was to ensure 
appropriate incentives for health workers – a task which the 
MoH Department of Organization and Personnel (DOP) 
sought to define further with development of a national 
HRH retention strategy inclusive of specific incentives 
and interventions aimed to increase work in rural areas.16 
The survey for our study was an important component of 
determining which incentives would motivate health workers 
most significantly.
Two-thirds of the Lao population resides in rural areas, but 
less than one quarter of public sector physicians practice in 
rural settings (Table 1).37,38 We focus on physicians in our 
study given that the differential between the population and 
health worker concentration is largest for physicians in Lao 
PDR. The lower density of health workers reduces access 
to health services in these areas and evidence suggests the 
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skewed distribution of physicians and health workers harms 
health outcomes.39 
The public sector is particularly important with respect to 
rural access since (a) public sector physicians comprise about 
70% of total physicians and (b) few private sector facilities 
are located in urban areas.40 With respect to production of 
new physicians, Lao PDR has one 6-year medical school, the 
University of Health Sciences Faculty of Medical Sciences, 
based in the capital city, Vientiane. There are limited number 
of new physicians generated each year. The survey target 
initially was aimed to reach all of the approximately 360 fifth 
and sixth year students – so about 180 graduates (minus 
attrition) are anticipated to join the health system per year.16 
The policy options for Lao PDR to improve distribution of 
health workers include (a) voluntary programs that use 
non-wage incentives such as housing, transportation or 
other perks to motivate health workers to locate in rural 
areas, (b) salary increases, (c) mandatory service, and (d) 
combinations of these choices for both practicing physicians, 
recent graduates or both sets of workers. This analytical work 
focuses on the evaluation of voluntary non-wage incentives 
for recent graduates and was conducted prior to the decision 
by the Lao PDR MoH to implement a mandatory 3-year 
placement of new physicians into rural settings. Specifically, 
our objective was to identify the most cost-effective of 15 non-
wage voluntary rural incentive packages for new physicians 
proposed for Lao PDR. While we focused on Lao PDR context, 
the methods, limitations, and results are informative for many 
other countries considering how to optimally anticipate and 
understand how their health workers and trainees will decide 
to locate under various policies.
Methods
Discrete Choice Experiment Instrument Development and 
Administration
The attributes and levels for the DCE were developed via a 
review of literature and qualitative focus group discussions 
with medical students and interviews with key stakeholders 
from the Lao PDR MoH.16,41 On the basis of the responses 
the final version included six attributes: salary (4 levels: 
50% increase, 40% increase, 30% increase, no increase), 
housing (3 levels: provision of house, allowance, no subsidy), 
transportation (3 levels: motorbike for work/leisure, 
motorbike for work only, no transportation benefit), career 
promotion (3 levels: immediate promotion to permanent staff 
upon posting, promotion after one year, promotion after two 
years), continuing education (3 levels: qualify for scholarship 
after one year, after two years, after three years) and facility 
quality (2 levels: improved vs. not improved). The limited 
subset of DCE scenario alternatives across these attribute 
levels was generated via use of Sawtooth Software’s Choice-
Based Conjoint package (Sawtooth Software Inc., 2007). This 
software maximizes D-efficiency optimization to ensure 
level balance (each attribute is shown an equal number of 
times) and orthogonality (attribute levels are independent 
of other attribute levels). The final survey instrument 
offered a series of 12 questions in which respondents chose 
between two hypothetical job postings with varying attribute 
levels. Additionally, the instrument obtained information 
on demographics, education, and background (Technical 
Appendix: Exhibits 1 and 2 for Survey and Design Efficiency 
Report).16 Based on the DCE attributes, we focused on 15 
incentive packages (Table 2).
Administrations of Discrete Choice Experiment
The data collection team included 15 members from the 
Table 1. Distribution of Health Workers in the Lao PDR Public System 
(2011)
MDs MAs Nurses/Midwives Population (1000s)
Number 1187 1463 5552 6275
Number Rural 273 693 3324 4131
Rural Share 0.23 0.47 0.60 0.66
Sources: WHO, Laos Country Profile 2012; UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects 2011 (Accessed July 2013). 
Abbreviations: MA, medical assistant; PDR, People’s Democratic Republic; 
MD, doctor of Medicine.
Table 2. Incentive Package Components Based on Lao PDR DCE (Medical Students, n = 329)
Components in Select Packages (Future Physicians)
Incentive Package Housing (Construction) Housing (Allowance) Transport Career Promotion Additional Training Facility Improvement
1 • •OP • •1
2 • •O • •1
3 • •O •1
4 • •OP •
5 •OP •1 •
6 • •O •
7 •OP •1
8 •O •1
9 •O • •
10 •OP •2
11 •O •
12 •O •2
13 • •2
14 • •2
15 •1
Abbreviations: DCE, discrete choice experiment; PDR, People’s Democratic Republic.
•OP Transport provided for official and personal use; O Transport for official use only; •1 Additional training available after one year of service; •2 Additional 
training available after two years of service.
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Lao PDR MoH and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
that subdivided into three smaller teams, one per province. 
Within each province the teams divided into two smaller 
teams for data collection activities. Prior to collection, 
teams participated in a one-day training in the application 
of the DCE survey and data collection protocols. All DCE 
surveys were administered to groups of respondents within 
a facility meeting room, classroom, or lecture hall using 
paper-based questionnaires. Each individual completed their 
survey independently and students indicated preferences for 
attributes related to 15 different incentive packages (Figure 
1). The average survey completion time was approximately 
20-30 minutes. Data collection occurred over a period of five 
days in May 2011. All respondents provided consent prior to 
participating in the study. Data was entered into Microsoft 
Excel and cross checked twice. The Lao PDR MoH gave ethical 
approval for the collection and use of data as part of efforts for 
health reform. Data were de-identified prior to analysis.
Discrete Choice Experiment Medical Student Sample
As is the case in many international medical schools, medical 
students in Lao PDR enroll in a 6-year program combining 
undergraduate and graduate medical education.42 As 
indicated earlier, Lao PDR has one training institution for 
physicians and, as such, this survey of students effectively 
incorporates a large share of the students nearing graduation 
throughout all of Laos.16 Table 3 characterizes the medical 
student sample (n = 329) which included fifth-year students 
(n = 197), sixth-year students (n = 127), and post-graduate 
students in the Family Medicine program (n = 5). Students 
were located either at clinical internships in three provincial 
hospitals (n = 20 Luang Prabang, n = 25 Savannakhet, n = 20 
Champasak) or on site at the University of Health Sciences in 
Vientiane (n = 264).
Valuation Analysis
In order to calculate the economic value of individual incentive 
components, we ran a mixed logit regression on the DCE 
medical student preference data. As the mixed logit requires 
distributional specifications, we assumed the parameters 
associated with the incentive components had a random 
normal distribution[1]. Given the distributional assumption, 
the mixed logit regression generates the parameters (mean 
and standard deviation [SD] of the relative utility of each 
component) which maximizes the likelihood that the data 
we see would have occurred.43 In order to assess valuation 
for each component, we divide the mean coefficient for each 
of the respective incentive components by the mean salary 
coefficient (at 100% salary level) and then multiply that figure 
by the reported public sector annual physician compensation 
(751450 LAK per month or US$1128 per year-2012). We 
assume that students are aware of this compensation level as 
they respond to the survey. So for component (c) and salary 
(s) valuation for a specific component would be expressed as:
c
c
s
Valuation Annual Salaryβ
β
= ×                                              (1)
Standard errors (SEs) for valuation (or willingness to 
pay) measures are generated using the delta method – an 
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Figure 1. Predicted Preference Impact (PPI) Estimates and 95% CIs for 
each Incentive Package.
PPI represents the probability of accepting the incentive package (relative 
to salary alone):
p
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X
p XX
ePPI
e e
β
ββ
=
+
where β are coefficients from the mixed logit regression, XP are the values 
associated with each particular incentive package (including base salary) 
and Xs are the values associated with base salary alone.
Table 3. DCE Sample Statistics for Medical Students (n = 329)
Descriptor Number (%)
Age 24.7 (5.1)a
Gender
    Female 191 (58.1)
    Male 138 (41.9)
Rural experience
   Yes 194 (59.0)
   No 135 (41.0)
Marital status
   Yes 46 (14.0)
   No 283 (86.0)
Have children 
   Yes 30 (9.1)
   No 299 (91.9)
Prior health worker experience
   Yes 39 (11.9)
   No 290 (88.1)
Rural rotation in study 
   Yes 263 (79.9)
   No 66 (20.1)
Religion
   Buddhist 274 (83.3)
   Muslim 44 (13.4)
   Christian 8 (2.4)
   Other 3 (0.9)
Ethnicity
   Lao 271 (82.4)
   Hmong 37 (11.2)
   Khmou 8 (2.4)
   Other 13 (4.0)
Tuition source
   Family/self 269 (81.8)
   Government sponsored 53 (16.1)
   NGO sponsored 6 (1.8)
   Other 1 (0.3)
Abbreviations: NGO, non-governmental organization; DCE, discrete choice 
experiment.
a Age category lists the mean age and SD in parentheses. 
Source: CapacityPlus Survey (2012).
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approach previously utilized and validated in similar DCE 
analyses.17,25,44 DCE analyses are conducted with STATA v. 
13 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA). We also ran 
a mixed logit using a willingness-to-pay approach (rather 
than preference approach) in which income is a random 
rather than fixed parameter and found similar results for the 
resulting coefficients, SEs, and SDs (Results are reported in 
the Technical Appendix, Exhibit 3).
Physician Density and Cost-Effectiveness
In order to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of hypothetic 
incentive packages (rather than individual components), 
we generate a model with three basic parts: (1) Estimation 
of the effect of rural incentive packages on rural and urban 
distribution of health workers over time relative to rural and 
urban population sizes, (2) Calculation of the direct costs 
of each incentive package, and (3) Assessment of the health 
effects associated with the geographic redistribution of health 
workers. 
Estimation of Health Worker Distribution
Given that some incentive package costs are variable and the 
health effects attributable to each package depend on location 
decision of health workers, the model first projects the 
number of health workers in three categories over time—(1) 
private sector workers [assumed to practice in urban areas: 
2011 Lao PDR MoH reported share = 0.30], (2) public sector 
urban workers [2011 share = 0.54], and (3) public sector 
rural workers [2011 share = 0.16].40 In the model, each of 
these sub-groups suffers attrition due to mortality, retirement 
and emigration (base case: 2.5% per year based on prior 
estimates of health worker production and attrition), but 
will also experience growth as a result of graduates entering 
the workforce within each group.45,46 Sensitivity analyses 
test whether the shift in these baseline distributions affects 
optimal incentive package choice. 
In the absence of a rural incentive package, we assume that 
new entrants will enter private, public-urban and public-rural 
service at the same rates as the current distribution of health 
workers for each cadre. If a rural incentive package were 
instituted on a voluntary basis, we conservatively assume that 
the share selecting private service will remain at its historic 
rate, but the allocation of public workers between urban and 
rural sites will tend toward more rural workers. Specifically, 
for a particular incentive package (i) offered to physicians 
in time period (t) the calculation for the estimate of the new 
doctor of medicine (MD) graduates entering a rural public 
position for any particular incentive package is:
New MDsRural Public i,t = New MDst * Share MDspublic * Share 
MDsRural|Public * [2*PPIi]
where the PPIi represents the Predicted Preference Impact 
estimate generated from the mixed logit DCE regression 
for each incentive package. The preference impact measure 
estimates what percentage of the sample population would 
prefer a job posting that offers a position which includes 
incentives relative to a position that offers the most basic 
incentive level.47,48 A PPI of 0.5 indicates that individuals are 
indifferent between the current package and a basic package 
(salary alone). Under this condition we assume that the 
relative risk of new physicians selecting rural postings equals 
1 (or 2*PPI). Also note that PPI has an upper bound value 
of 1.0 (or 100%). We make the conservative assumption 
here that the relative risk of new physicians entering the 
rural postings doubles (RR = 2) under this extreme case. 
We note this may be a somewhat conservative assumption 
for two reasons. First, a recent health workforce DCEs in a 
similar geography (Vietnam) which did explicitly include 
“rural vs. urban” location as an attribute as well as other 
attributes similar to the attributes in our Lao PDR study 
such as continuing education, skills development, facilities/
equipment access and housing found that the probability of 
rural uptake approximately doubled for each of the following 
incentives: facilities/equipment (2.2 Odds Ratio [OR]), long 
term education (2.3 OR), skills development (2.1 OR) or 
home subsidy (1.7 OR).25 By assuming a maximum OR of 
two in our study, even if all incentives are implemented, our 
uptake probabilities are likely biased downward, our cost-
effectiveness ratios are likely biased upwards and we are more 
likely to reject incentive packages as cost-effective. Second, 
in our model we are narrowly focusing on the expected 
responses of graduating medical students to voluntary rural 
incentive packages. If these packages also motivate existing 
physicians to shift their location preferences the number of 
physicians in rural positions would increase (For more detail 
on the location decision estimation process see Technical 
Appendix, Exhibit 3a). In fact, when we estimate valuations 
for existing physicians using the same DCE survey (n = 104), 
we found similar results and valuations among practicing 
physicians in relation to medical students (see Technical 
Appendix, Exhibit 6). Another reason for our conservative 
approach is that, as the case with any DCE, each respondent’s 
future behavior may deviate (either positively or negatively) 
from their current expected behavior as preferences may shift 
over time.
Given the similar valuations placed on each of the attributes 
relative to salary in the physician and student DCE surveys, 
we make the simplifying assumption that preferences will 
stay static over time, although we do conduct univariate 
sensitivity analyses to see if the optimal incentive program 
choice changes for individuals with high (+1 SD) or low (-1 
SD) weights for attributes which have statistically significant 
SDs. Other prior work on DCEs have used dynamic models 
and the richness of mean and SD output from DCEs in 
student and practicing health worker samples to estimate 
shifts in location for a cohort of health workers over time with 
Monte Carlo simulations to generate outcomes measuring 
rural health worker rural years and total variable costs of 
incentive programs.33,34 In our case, the static assumption of 
preferences makes attribution of fixed costs (discussed below) 
across individuals clearer. Two additional limitations deserve 
mention with respect to the DCE survey. First there was no 
definition of “rural” provided in the DCE so individuals may 
interpret the “rural” characterization differently. Second, no 
formal dominance testing was conducted on the sample. 
Direct Costs of Incentive Package Components (Fixed and 
Variable Costs) 
The incentive packages include components that result in 
variable costs that depend on the degree of annual uptake by 
Keuffel et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(7), 383–394388
physicians graduates and fixed costs that do not respond to 
uptake (Table 4). Future costs are calculated in real terms by 
multiplying the relevant present value cost by ‘1 + inflation 
rate’ estimated by the World Economic Outlook Database 
and dividing by ‘1 + financial discount rate.’ As inflation rates 
are only estimated for a 5-year window, we used the financial 
discount rate (base case = 0.03) as the inflation rate after 
year 5. 
Fixed cost components include the capital improvement and 
equipment upgrades for district (n = 120) and local (n = 836) 
health facilities. These improvements occur over time (10 
facilities per year in the case of district facility upgrades; 100 
per year in the case of local facility upgrades). As the facility 
improvements are capital costs, the accounting of costs may 
follow either a “cash” or “depreciation” accounting method. 
Under traditional cash accounting, our base case assumption, 
all costs accrue immediately. In the case of the depreciation 
approach, we assume a “straightline” 30-year depreciation 
schedule for capital projects and a 7-year schedule for the 
equipment acquisitions.
Variable costs include housing construction, housing 
allowances, transportation (motorcycles), additional training, 
and accelerated career advancement. Similar to the facility 
improvement costs, the housing construction costs can either 
follow a “cash” or “depreciation” accounting methodology. 
Housing and housing allowances are offered only to new rural 
health workers. Also, in the case of physicians only 50% of 
the eligible physician pool is assumed to accept the housing 
construction benefit (as estimated in prior costing studies 
from Laos). With respect to the transportation benefit, the 
model assumes 100% uptake by eligible health workers. 
Accelerated career promotion results in access to grants 
for additional education and conferences. Only new health 
workers qualify for accelerated career promotion (in some 
cases occurring after 1 year of service, in some cases after 
2 years of service). Additional training, a separate benefit, 
is conferred across all health workers (not just new health 
workers), but the annual probability of uptake is low (0.18 for 
MDs) since individuals only qualify periodically. 
Estimation of Health Effects
We rely on a cross-national WHO analysis that estimates a 
non-linear relationship between physician density and infant 
mortality rate (IMR), under-5 mortality rate (excluding infant 
mortality, U5MR) and maternal mortality rate (MMR) to assess 
the discounted life years saved as a result of improved health 
worker density in rural areas (and the reduction in discounted 
life years that occurs due to relatively lower health worker 
density in urban areas than would be the case in absence of 
a rural incentive package).39 Given we are examining health 
effects within Lao PDR, we rely on the assumption that cross-
national effects related to density have similar dynamics 
within a country. We concentrate on these three outcomes as 
there is no known reliable data on the effect of other health 
outcomes but also note that the healthy years contributed 
by these outcomes affect young cohorts (infants, young 
children and relatively young mothers) so these outcomes 
represent more sizable reduction (on a per case basis) than, 
say, treatment of a chronic condition late in life. We assume 
that the cross-national estimates serve as reasonable proxies 
for gauging the effects of within-country physician density 
variation on health outcomes. While we accept that the 
relationship between density and health outcomes may suffer 
from potential endogeneity[2], we posit that there is likely a 
positive causal impact of health workers on health outcomes 
and this impact likely extends to outcomes outside the three 
mortality rates focused on in this study. To the extent this is 
the case, our estimates are likely underreporting the impact of 
physician density on health. Nevertheless additional research 
which more precisely delineates the causal effects of density 
on health outcomes will provide a sharper measure of the 
health implications in future studies. 
Calculation of the discounted life years saved as a result of the 
rural incentive packages occurs in two steps. In the first major 
step, we estimate how the annual outcome (IMR, MMR, and 
U5MR) incidence changes in both rural and urban settings. 
Table 4. Costs for Rural Incentive Package Components in Lao PDRa,b
Incentive Package Components Incentive Package Components
(Uptake Dependent) (Independent of Uptake)
Housing incentives Facility improvement (district level)
  Construction (single family home)c $12 500   DH facility Investment (upgrade 1 building) $100 000 
  Allowance (annual) $360   Number of DH facilities upgrades per yeard 10
Transport (motorbike)   DH facility Investment (equipment upgrade) $25 000
  Annual cost of lease $500 Facility improvement (local level)
  Maintenance $125   HC facility building investment (upgrade) $25 000 
Additional training   Number of HC facilities upgrades per yeare 100
  Cost of additional training (MD)c $5600   HC facility equipment investment (upgrade) $4250
Career promotione
  Career promotion (MD) $1500   
Abbreviations: PDR, People’s Democratic Republic; MD, doctor of medicine.
a Source: CapacityPlus working paper “Costing of Incentives to Attract and Retain Rural Health Workers in Lao PDR” unless otherwise noted.49
b Costs are in $US 2011 unless otherwise specified.  Annual discount rates for multiyear costs and benefits are 0.03 for the financial discount rate and 0.03 for 
health effects (QALY) discount rate. 
c Note that 18% of qualifying physicians receive additional training in any one year so the average cost across qualifying physicians is $1008.
d There are a total of 120 District Level Health Facilities (DH).
e There are a total of 836 Local Level Health Facilities (HC).
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Specifically for the first step, the model starts by calculating 
the health worker density in year (t) and location (l, either 
rural or urban). For the denominator, we use projections and 
growth rates from the 2011 World Urbanization Prospects 
report from the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social 
Affairs Population Division to estimate the population and 
rural/urban distribution for every year in the analysis.37 
Health worker densities are generated for both the scenario 
when the rural incentive package is instituted and the scenario 
when no package is instituted. We can estimate the percent 
change in density by location and year and multiply this by 
the coefficient from the log-log density regression result in 
the WHO analysis (which reflects the elasticity of change 
in outcome with respect to the change in density of health 
workers) for each outcome measure. 
 
Coefo[ ]× %∆ Densityl,t  =  %∆ Outcomeo,l,t
Knowing the baseline IMR, MMR or U5MR incidence for Lao 
PDR, we then generate an absolute figure for cases averted 
(or gained in the case of urban health worker densities that 
decrease as a result of the incentive package) for each outcome 
in each year. The net number of cases averted (or gained) at 
the country level is simply the product of the cases averted 
in rural areas plus the cases gained in urban areas. Thus, for 
each year of the analysis, we determine the expected number 
of IMR, MMR, and U5MR cases averted at the country level 
as a result of the shift in densities mediated by the rural health 
worker incentive package.
In the second step, the net reduction in country level 
incidence calculated for each outcome is multiplied by the 
expected discounted QALYs associated with each outcome. 
For MMR, we assume that mothers are age 25 and estimate 
life expectancy remaining from that point.40 Healthy years are 
discounted at a 3% rate in the base case. Each of the life years 
is multiplied by an age-specific QALY/Life Year ratio which 
results in QALY measure for each year of life by age. Absent 
age-specific QALY-life year ratios for Laos, we relied on the 
general population measures reported previously.50 The result 
of the second step is a measure of discounted QALYs saved for 
each outcome (o) in each year (l) across all of Lao PDR based 
on the incentive package (i). 
Hence given the direct costs and the health benefit estimation, 
we generate an average cost-effectiveness ratio for each of the 
15 incentive packages (relative to no incentive package) and 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios which identify the most 
cost-effective packages.51,52 
Results
Valuation of Incentive Components
Relative to utility associated with salary, each of the 
components has a statistically significantly positive value 
(Table 5) with mean valuations ranging between $500 
(Continuing Education Benefit) to $188 (Improved Facility 
Table 5. Mixed Logit Regression Results, Implied Valuations (n = 7896 Evaluations Across 329 Medical Students) and Actual Costs
Incentive Package Component
Mean Utility 
Coefficienta Estimates
(SE)
SD
(If Applicable)b
Implied Valuation of 
Component $USc
(95% CId)
Annual Cost 
Estimate ($US)
Valuation/Cost
(95% CI)
Salary (annual salary = $1128 ) 2.46 (0.17) -- $1128 $1128 1.00
Housing allowance 0.71 (0.07) 0.24 $326 ($260–$392) $360 0.91 (0.72–1.09)
Housing provision 0.68 (0.06) 0.23 $312 ($249–$375) $417e 0.75 (0.60–0.90)
Career promotion (immediate) 0.67 (0.08) 0.80*** $307 ($231–$382) $1500 0.20 (0.15–0.25)
Career promotion (1 year wait) 0.46 (0.06) 0.10 $211 ($155–$270) $1406f 0.15 (0.11–0.19)
Continuing education benefit (1 year wait) 1.09 (0.08) 0.59*** $500 ($415–$579) $945g 0.53 (0.44–0.61)
Continuing education benefit (2 year wait) 0.62 (0.06) 0.13 $284 ($219–$348) $897g 0.32 (0.24–0.39)
Facility quality 0.41 (0.06) 0.80*** $188 ($129–$242) $1030h 0.18 (0.12–0.24)
Transportation (official use only) 0.66 (0.06) 0.12 $303 ($233–$369) $625 0.48 (0.37–0.59)
Transportation (official and informal use) 0.80 (0.07) 0.36** $367 ($292–$441) $625 0.59 (0.47–0.70)
Abbreviations: SE, standard error; SD, standard deviation; DCE, discrete choice experiment; PDR, People’s Democratic Republic; MoH, Ministry of Health.
a All utility coefficients are significant at the P < .01 level. We also estimated the valuations using a willingness to pay DCE model (with salary as a variable rather 
than fixed parameter estimate) and generated very similar coefficient estimates.
b P < .001***, P < .01**, P < .05*
c Salary estimate for a public sector physician in Lao PRD for 2011-2012 was 751 450 LAK (Lao PDR MoH). The exchange rate value in $US is $1128 (exchange 
rate = 7993 LAK per $US of 8/1/2012 XE.com). Implied valuations are calculated by dividing the coefficient value for each component by the salary coefficient 
and multiplying by the annual salary for physicians in Lao PDR. Online technical appendix also shows results for valuations of practicing physicians which were 
similar to medical students.
d 95% CIs are calculated using the delta method. 
e Housing provision cost estimate assumes $12 500 cost is depreciated over a 30-year period.
f Career promotion cost with one year lag is equal to initial cost divided by 1.067 given inflation of 6.7% expected over the first year.
g Continuing education after one and two years are discounted using inflation (0.067 in year one and 0.053 in year two according to World Bank estimates). Also 
the benefit is conferred to just 18% of the qualifying physician population in any one year. 
h Facility quality is a fixed cost so per person variable cost estimates depend on uptake. We use package five to estimate uptake (21 physicians) and calculate 
total year 1 depreciated costs ($213 K). We then assume that one tenth of the costs are attributable to the rural incentive package as there are likely other 
benefits which accrue to the health system toward which some of the costs could be allocated (eg, attracting other health workers types, etc). This cost estimate 
assumes “straight line” depreciation accounting for both district and regional health center capital and equipment expenditures. Capital costs are depreciated 
using a 30-year schedule and equipment 7 years. 
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Quality). The utility valuations remain similar across student 
subgroups (all student with the exception of post-graduates 
[n = 324], students with a rural rotation experience [n = 263], 
students without a rural rotation experience [n = 66], fifth 
year students [n = 197], sixth year students [n = 127]; see 
Technical Appendix Exhibit 5 for regression results). A 
sample of practicing physicians (n = 104) had relatively similar 
utilization coefficients although the practicing physicians 
valued transportation, career promotion and facility quality 
more and continuing education somewhat less than medical 
students (see Technical Appendix, Exhibit 6). Naturally these 
valuations are sensitive to the level of public sector salary 
(estimated value = $1128) which we assume is consistent over 
time in the public sector. 
With the exception of housing allowances the ratio of private 
valuation relative to program costs for incentives were 
generally significantly less than one and capital intensive 
attributes (eg, capital expense to improve facility quality) 
had relatively low valuations in relation to cost. The fact that 
respondents generally value incentives at a lower level than 
the cost to the government payer may reflect their medical 
student status but does indicate they are not overestimating the 
value of components. We interpret this finding as support for 
DCE methodology as a valid mechanism to assess behavioral 
response. If anything, the bias appears to tilt against changing 
behaviors in response to programs – the standard critique of 
DCEs frequently argues otherwise.
While initial costs exceed individual benefit value, several 
of the benefits of these program components likely yield 
significant spillovers outside the narrow purpose of 
motivating physicians to relocate. For example, upgrading 
facilities naturally will not only motivate more health workers 
to practice in rural settings, but also will likely improve quality 
of care and access measures in ways that are external to our 
analyses. Those components with the highest individual value/
program cost ratios are housing allowances and provision and 
transportation programs – components in which the social 
benefit is likely concentrated on the qualifying physicians with 
little additional spillovers. The indirect benefits which accrue 
to society via improved health as a result of the resultant shifts 
in physician geographic distribution are not accounted for in 
these valuation ratios.
Predicted Preference Impact Estimates of Incentive Packages
The expected predicted preference impacts (PPIs) of the 
15 incentive packages ranged from 0.955 to 0.722 (Figure 
1). Those packages with more components would naturally 
would be more preferable and generally have larger PPI 
values. Of course, the cost of the incentive packages has 
not yet been factored into the analysis, but this provides 
reassuring evidence that the respondents are providing 
rational responses.
Uptake of Rural Positions by Physicians
Relative to no incentive package, the year 5 (year 30) density of 
rural physicians per 10 000 rural Lao inhabitants is anticipated 
to increase by between 10% to 18% (41% to 76%) depending 
on which incentive package is selected (Table 6). These 
density measures account for the anticipated urbanization the 
UN expects among the Lao population during this time. The 
optimal program (incentive package #4, discussed below) is 
expected to increase density by 15% (5 years) and 65% (30 
years), respectively. 
Cost-Effectiveness 
While the valuation and uptake results inform the policy 
decision regarding voluntary rural incentive programs, the 
optimal program choice should jointly account for direct 
program costs and the health benefits that accrue from the 
program from a societal perspective (Table 7). In the base case 
(5 years, cash accounting) scenario, average cost per QALY 
ranged from $1454 (package 4) to $55 762 (package 9) and 
7 of the 15 packages had average CERs less than the WHO 
recommended threshold (GDP*3 = $3786 in Lao PDR). 
Table 6. Rural Physician Counts and Density Estimates by Incentive Package for Lao PDR over Time (Medical Student DCE Survey)
Incentive Package
Base Case Estimates
2016 Estimated No. of Rural 
MDs
2016 Estimated Rural MD 
Density1
2041 Estimated No. of Rural 
MDs
2041 Estimated Rural MD 
Density1
No Incentive 300 0.74 703 2.08
1 354 0.87 1235 3.66
2 353 0.87 1229 3.64
3 349 0.86 1185 3.51
4 347 0.86 1162 3.44
5 348 0.86 1173 3.48
6 345 0.85 1143 3.39
7 343 0.85 1127 3.39
8 341 0.84 1107 3.28
9 341 0.84 1106 3.28
10 336 0.83 1055 3.12
11 334 0.82 1038 3.07
12 333 0.82 1028 3.05
13 334 0.82 1038 3.08
14 333 0.82 1032 3.06
15 329 0.81 988 2.93
Abbreviations: PDR, People’s Democratic Republic; DCE, discrete choice experiment; MD, doctor of medicine.
1 Rural density represents the number of rural physicians per 10 000 rural inhabitants.
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Table 7. Rural Incentive Package Cost-Effectiveness Estimates for Laos PDR (Medical Student DCE Survey)
Base Case
(Cash Accounting, 5-Year Time Horizon)
Base Case
(Depreciation Accounting, 5-Year Time Horizon)
Base Case
(Cash Accounting, 30 Year Time Horizon)
Incentive 
Package
Direct Cost of Incentive Package 
(A) $US (2012)
Net Discounted 
QALYs Gained (B)
Average Cost per 
QALY
ICER Average Cost per QALY ICER
Average Cost per  
QALY
ICER
1 $2 836 963 534 $5311 $29 523 $4051 $20 351 $5487 $24 988
2 $2 826 972 528 $5356 Dom. $4088 Dom. $5525 Dom.
3 $2 347 845 484 $4851 Dom. $3523 Dom. $5150 Dom.
4 $669 983 461 $1454 $1454 $1454 $1454 $2380 $2380
5 $23 594 809 472 $50 022 Dom. $10 481 Dom. $9965 Dom.
6 $1 283 630 441 $2909 Dom. $1511 Dom. $3083 Dom.
7 $1 604 154 426 $3769 Dom. $3769 Dom. $4530 Dom.
8 $1 594 078 406 $3927 Dom. $3927 Dom. $4676 Dom.
9 $22 543 898 404 $55 762 Dom. $9629 Dom. $8838 Dom.
10 $1 252 563 353 $3550 Dom. $3550 Dom. $5092 Dom.
11 $536 504 336 $1598 Dom. $1598 Dom. $2416 Dom.
12 $1 239 995 326 $3803 Dom. $3803 Dom. $5385 Dom.
13 $1 114 205 337 $3310 Dom. $3310 Dom. $4135 Dom.
14 $1 670 451 331 $5054 Dom. $3390 Dom. $4957 Dom.
15 $1 047 792 286 $3662 Dom. $3662 Dom. $4159 Dom.
Abbreviations: PDR, People’s Democratic Republic; DCE, discrete choice experiment; QALY, quality-adjusted life year; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; Dom. = Dominated (Incentive Package is either weakly or strongly dominated 
by other options).
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As indicated in Figure 2, two packages (4 and 1) had non-
dominated incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) and 
package 4 was the optimal choice as its ICER ($1454) was 
the only one less than or equal to the WHO threshold CER 
level.51,52 
Across all univariate sensitivity analyses, the average and 
incremental CERs typically shifted, but the optimal choice 
remained package 4. The sensitivity analyses included 
accounting methodology (depreciation vs. cash), duration 
(30 vs. 5 years), utility value for career promotion (+/- 1 SD), 
utility value for continuing education benefit (+/- 1 SD), 
utility value for upgraded facilities (+/-1 SD), utility value 
for full transportation benefit (+/-1 SD), 50% increase in 
base salary (new rural physicians only), 50% increase in base 
salary (apply to all rural physicians), 50% larger (or smaller) 
initial rural share of physicians, high discount rate (5% vs. 
3%), low discount rate (1% vs. 3%), high attrition rate (5% 
vs. 2.5%), low attrition rate (1% vs. 2.5%), high public sector 
share of physicians (85% vs. 70%), and low public sector share 
of physicians (55% vs. 70%). [See Technical Appendix Exhibit 
4 for sensitivity analysis result details]. Since package 4 
featured non-capital intensive attributes (housing allowance, 
transportation benefit and accelerated career promotion) its 
base case 5-year costs were second lowest ($670 K), but its 
anticipated health effects were fourth highest (461 QALYs 
gained) among the 15 options.
Discussion
As the use of DCEs has grown in health economics and health 
services research, an emergent literature has focused on the 
job choice of health workers in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs).19,23-25,53 Some analyses are now combining 
program cost data with DCEs to account for the anticipated 
cost of influencing health worker job choices within these 
resource constrained settings over time.33,34 Our analysis 
contributes to this literature in the context of Lao PDR and 
we apply novel methods which can help inform future studies 
that aim to identify optimal incentive options by accounting 
for costs and benefits to the health system and improvements 
in health outcomes. In order to place our results in context it 
is important to understand the three important caveats of our 
study: lack of a rural-urban attribute, the assumption of static 
preferences over time and the association between health 
Figure 2. Cost-Effectivensss Frontier Plot for 15 Incentive Packages.
worker density and health outcomes. 
Given the context of the initial study was focused on rural 
employment alone, our initial design did not incorporate a 
rural vs. urban attribute. For future studies in settings with 
rural disparities, this is an easy adjustment to incorporate in 
the design phase of a project (albeit sometimes addition of an 
extra attribute comes at the expense of omitting competing 
attributes or greater survey complexity). In our case, we 
estimate the uptake probabilities of rural service indirectly 
and, as such, adopt a methodology which likely results in 
more conservative assumptions with respect to uptake. So 
long as this bias affects our evaluation of incentive packages 
in a consistent manner, our optimal choice (package 4) likely 
would still be chosen had the initial design incorporated a 
geography attribute. Optimally the design would offer an “opt 
out” option to limit upward uptake bias particularly for nurse 
or other health worker cadres where the likelihood of a non-
healthcare job is somewhat greater than among physicians 
(in our case it is unlikely that medical students would opt 
for a non-physician position in the labor market given their 
monetary and temporal investment). 
Given that some of our models focus on a thirty year period 
(in part to match the depreciation schedules common for 
cost accounting of major capital expenditures) consideration 
should be given to how preferences shift over time. In other 
studies, novel Monte Carlo models with multiple DCE sub-
groups at different career stages explicitly allow for the shift 
in preferences as a cohort ages and account for variability 
in preference within a particular time period. We assumed 
that preferences remain static with respect to attributes in 
the DCE, in part, as the relative utility (in relation to salary) 
appeared to not deviate too extensively in our medical student 
sample and our practicing physicians sample.
The last critical caveat for our study is the assumption that 
the health worker density-health outcomes association is not 
endogenous. In order to map out the health outcomes impact 
of health worker redistribution, further study to understand 
the causal impact of density disparities and health outcomes, 
particularly within countries, would improve predictions for 
cost-effectiveness approaches. For our Lao PDR study we 
think we made relatively conservative approach to estimating 
QALYs since we focus on just a subset of health outcomes. 
Again, so long as the bias is consistent across attributes, we 
likely have not deviated from the optimal choice. To the extent 
the relationship can be clarified in the future, generating 
cost per QALY CERs may allow for additional comparison 
with other competing interventions (eg, mandated rural 
health worker policies, vaccines) vying for resources. One 
of the benefits of moving health worker DCEs into a cost-
effectiveness framework is the ability to not only determine 
what the optimal choice is for one’s limited study, but also to 
assess whether that choice represents a wise use of resources 
relative to a wide range of potential investments on health 
amid the limited MoH budgets in LMICs. 
Conclusion
Conditional on selecting one of the 15 incentive bundles, the 
optimal choice from the Lao PDR MoH perspective is package 
4 as it combines low cost, non-capital intensive incentives that 
are effective in motivating graduates to enter into rural service. 
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Our evaluation method builds on prior DCE health worker 
studies as it assess valuation of attributes and predicts resultant 
health worker geographic decisions, but we also extend our 
analysis to incorporate a cost-effectiveness framework that 
can determine whether the intervention represents a wise 
use of resources from a cost per QALY perspective. Given the 
methodological caveats of our study, we believe it is possible 
we have overestimated the CERs of each of the incentive 
bundles, but the optimal choice was unlikely to shift among 
the 15 options as a result of the bias given its superiority 
relative to the other 14 options. As our optimal option still 
has an ICER less than the WHO threshold recommendation, 
we think it represented a judicious choice, but MoHs are 
certainly not bound to implement the policy. In fact, the Lao 
PDR MoH opted for a three year mandatory service program 
for recent health worker graduates—an option which is likely 
lower in cost, but also may hinder long run rural uptake if 
incentives are completely excluded. While less expensive, 
the restrictions of a mandatory program are prompting the 
Lao MoH to consider inclusion of limited additional benefits 
perhaps to encourage participants to remain in rural settings 
after the mandatory window expires. As other countries 
grapple with how to rebalance the geographic distribution of 
health workers, they will have to consider whether additional 
benefits are administratively feasible and which combination 
of incentives offers the best return on investment within a fixed 
budget. We encourage further research combining DCEs with 
cost data to generate more awareness of costs and benefits of 
health worker incentives programs in LMICs. Whether the 
novel methods generate cost-effectiveness ratios or other 
alternative metrics for decision-making, additional research 
in other geographies that use novel methods will continue to 
improve the information upon which health worker policies 
are implemented in resource constrained countries. 
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within a country from a rural to urban area.
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